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commits a tortious act within the state. . . .' " The court,
therefore, held that the defendant was subject to in personam
jurisdiction, not only for the decedent's transaction of business
prior to death and for his own transaction of business within the
state as executor for the deceased, but also for the defendant's
alleged commission of a tortious act.
Prior case law indicates that there is a constitutional issue
as to whether an in personam judgment can be rendered against
a foreign executor in his capacity as executor of the estate."
Since the law does not appear to be clear in this area, it is
interesting to note that the issue was not raised in the case.
It may be that the "minimum contacts" theory extinguishes foreign
executor immunity in a CPLR 302 situation. However, the
Nexsen case appears to be the first case involving the liability of
a foreign executor under CPLR 302, and a ruling on the con-
stitutional question by the court would have been helpful.
Physical injury not required by CPLR 302(a)(2).
In Hoard v. U.S. Paint, Lacquer & Chem. Co.,45 plaintiff
sought damages and rescission for defendant's fraudulent repre-
sentations and warranties basing jurisdiction on CPLR 302(a)(1)
and (a) (2). The contract was made in Missouri, and defendant
had no officers or agents in New York. The agreement stated
that the relation between the parties was one of independent con-
tractor and distributor and not principal and agent. Plaintiff
alleged that defendant's agent made false and fraudulent repre-
sentations in New York which induced plaintiff to enter into the
contract. The court held that if plaintiff had relied exclusively on
CPLR 302(a)(1), defendant's motion to dismiss would have
been granted. However, since the complaint alleged fraud, there
was an allegation that a tortious act had been committed in New
York.4 8  Thus, CPLR 302(a)(2) was applicable.
Although originally it was proposed to limit the application of
CPLR 302(a)(2) to cases involving physical injury, it was ulti-
mately decided to except therefrom only those causes of action
arising from defamation of character.47
-IsId. at 632, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
44 See, e.g., Matter of Riggle, 11 N.Y.2d 73, 77, 181 N.E2d 436, 437,
226 N.Y.S.2d 416, 417 (1962); Leighton v. Roper, 300 N.Y. 434, 438-39, 91
N.E.2d 876, 878 (1950); McMaster v. Gould, 240 N.Y. 379, 384-85, 148
N.E. 556, 559 (1925); Helme v. Buckelew, 229 N.Y. 363, 373, 128 N.E.
216, 219 (1920).
4544 Misc. 2d 72, 253 N.Y.S.2d 89 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
4Id. at 73, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
-FiFTH REP. 67. It was stated therein that a conversion of property
is included as a tortious act under CPLR 302(a)(2). See Nexsen v. Ira
Haupt & Co., discussed in text at note 42 supra.
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In regard to the court's determination that CPLR 302(a)(1)
was not applicable, it is submitted that jurisdiction could be obtained
over a defendant on similar facts. CPLR 302(a)(1) does not
require that defendant execute the contract in New York. It has
been held that activity in furtherance of a contract is enough
to subject the defendant to in personam jurisdiction. 48  The facts
in the instant case indicate that defendant's -agent made fraudulent
representations in New York, which induced plaintiff to enter
the contract. This might have amounted to "activity in further-
ance of a contract" by defendant's agent in New York. If so,
this would be a transaction of defendant's business from which
the cause of action arose, and CPLR 302(a) (1) requirements
would be satisfied. Where defendant has availed himself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the state, he obtains the
benefit and protection of the state's laws, and in so far as the
cause of action arose therefrom, sufficient basis is established for
jurisdictional purposes. 49 In such a case, the fact that the contract
was executed and to be performed elsewhere would be immaterial.
Another case involving a non-physical tort was Bright Radio
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ilich5 0 decided under Section 404(a) (2)
of the Uniform District Court Act.51 Plaintiff loaned certain
equipment to defendant in Nassau County. The equipment was
taken by the defendant to his place of business in the Bronx, and
upon his refusal to return it, plaintiff served summons and com-
plaint in the Bronx pursuant to UDCA § 404(a) (2) (commission
of a tortious act). Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground
that the tort, if any, was committed in the Bronx, and therefore,
that the Nassau County District Court had no jurisdiction. The
court held that the tort of conversion occurred in Nassau County,
i.e., the county where the property was bailed. The court analogized
to a criminal action for larceny, in which case the county from
which the property was bailed may exercise jurisdiction when
the property should have been" returned to that county.52
In Bright, the article should have been returned to Nassau
County. The court, therefore, held that the Nassau County District
Court had jurisdiction. In a civil tort action, however, it is
difficult to see how UDCA § 404(a) (2) could apply. There was no
wrongful appropriation committed in Nassau County, and it would
48 Iroquois Gas Corp. v. Collins, 42 Misc. 2d 632, 635, 248 N.Y.S.2d
494, 497 (Sup. Ct. 1964); accord, Kropp Forge Co. v. Jawitz, 37 Ill. App.
2d 475, 186 N.E.2d 76 (1962).
49 See Hanson v. Denckla, supra note 27, at 253; International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, supra note 20, at 319.
50 44 Misc. 2d 1018, 255 N.Y.S.2d 632 (Nassau County Dist. Ct. 1965).
51 UDCA § 404 is the district court longarm statute.
52 See, e.g., People v. Mitchell, 49 App. Div. 531, 63 N.Y. Supp. 522
(4th Dep't), affd, 168 N.Y. 604, 61 N.E. 182 (1901).
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appear, therefore, that no tortious act was committed in Nassau
County.
Foreign manufacturer of defective component part held in
personam under CPLR 302(a)(2).
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,53 the
leading case holding the manufacturer of a defective component
part subject to in personam jurisdiction, has apparently been
adopted in New York. The case of Johnson v. Equitable Life
Assur. Soc.5 4 involved a defective speed reducer component manu-
factured by a Michigan corporation not doing business in New
York. This speed reducer, the price of which was almost $1,800,
was included in an assembled electric scaffold which fell, causing
the deaths of plaintiffs' decedents. The component manufactured
by defendant was purchased by a New Jersey manufacturer for
inclusion in the new glass wall skyscrapers in New York City.
Defendant, Michigan Tool, knew these facts and had occasion to
inspect at least one of these installations of the completed product
in New York. The appellate division, in holding defendant in
personam under CPLR 302(a) (2) stated that the sales and services
amounted to "substantial contacts" thus satisfying due process
regardless of the fact that there was an intermediate sale through
the New Jersey manufacturer. The court further stated that it was
unnecessary to determine whether CPLR 302 (a) (2) would extend
to any component regardless of its cost or function or the ability
of the manufacturer to foresee that the product would be intro-
duced into New York. It was sufficient that defendant's contacts
with New York "were substantial, were indirectly productive of
substantial revenue . . . and the use of its products in this State
was within the ambit of its lively expectations and wishes." 55
Although it appears that Gray has been adopted in New York,
the practitioner is advised to be wary of relying on a Gray situation.
An opposing attorney might well distinguish the instant case from
Gray for several reasons. The defective component in the Gray
case was a valve included in a completed hot water heater. Though
indispensible to the hot water heater, a valve is not a very costly
item. The cost of the speed reducer was very substantial. In Gray
it was not determined how many valves had been introduced into
the state. There was a reasonable inference that other of defendant's
valves were in use in Illinois. In the instant case, a number of
these speed reducers were sold to the New Jersey manufacturer
to be used in New York. As opposed to Gray, there was physical
activity by the defendant in New York in Johnson. Finally, the
5322 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
5422 App. Div. 2d 138, 254 N.Y.S.2d 258 (1st Dep't 1964).55 1d. at 140, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 260-61.
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